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"Why are judges [who are] so good making so many errors?"'
That question, posed at a hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee in
July 1999, nicely captures one of the principal arguments made in the
Final Report of the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the
Federal Courts of Appeals. The Commission, chaired by retired
Supreme Court Justice Byron White, recommended that Congress divide
the existing Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals into three "adjudicative
divisions," each of which would operate almost as an independent
appellate court. 2 Restructuring is necessary, the Commission said,
because "the law-declaring function of appellate courts requires groups3
of judges smaller than the present Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals."
That conclusion, in turn, rested on the Commission's view that "a
smaller decisional unit can more effectively
maintain the coherence and
4
correctness of the law of that unit."
The reference to "coherence" in the Commission's rationale came as no
surprise. Critics of the Ninth Circuit have long argued that a large court
of appeals inevitably has difficulty maintaining consistency in its
decisional law; in embracing that view, the Commission ploughed
familiar ground. What is new is the emphasis on "correctness."
A recurring theme in the Commission report is the idea that smaller
adjudicative units will be better able to produce decisions that are
"correct" and to rectify panel rulings that are "aberrant."5 The inference
is clear: the Ninth Circuit today generates a disproportionate number of
panel decisions that are wrong, and the existing en banc process fails to
provide the necessary corrective.
The latter point has been made explicitly by the United States
' Review of the Report by the Commission on StructuralAlternativesfor the Federal Courts of
Appeals Regardingthe Ninth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit ReorganizationAct: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,106th Cong.
84 (1999) (prepared statement of Hon. Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit) [hereinafter 1999 Senate Hearing].
2 Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Final
Report 41 (1998) [hereinafter Final Report]. Citations to Final Report can be found at
http://app.comm.uscourts.gov (last visited Oct. 25, 2000). Hard copies of all cited Final
Report documents are on file with the UC Davis Law Review.
Although the Commission described the divisions as "semi-autonomous," see Final
Report, supra, at 43, analysis demonstrates that the autonomy would be almost complete.
See Arthur D. Hellman, The Unkindest Cut: The White Commission Proposal to Restructure the
Ninth Circuit, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 377, 381-93 (2000) [hereinafter Hellman, Unkindest Cut].
Final Report, supra note 2, at 47.
Id. at 51.
See, e.g., id. at 30, 48.
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Department of Justice. The Department opposes the Commission
recommendation for adjudicative units. Nevertheless, it agrees that a
"shortcoming" of the Ninth Circuit today is "its failure
effectively to
6
address erroneous panel decisions in important cases."
If the evidence establishes that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is
handicapped in maintaining the "correctness" of its decisional law by
reason of its size, that would be a strong argument in favor of
restructuring. It is therefore important to test the validity of the
proposition. That is the task undertaken by this article. The article is in
four parts. Part I provides background on the Commission proposal and
identifies two possible standards for testing the "correctness" of a court
of appeals panel decision. Part II posits that correctness is measured by
the views of the United States Supreme Court. It examines the Ninth
Circuit's record of reversals in the Supreme Court to determine whether
that record points to systematic failings in the way the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals carries out its business. Part III considers "correctness"
from the perspective of majority rule within the circuit. It focuses on the
Ninth Circuit's unique mechanism for rectifying aberrant panel
decisions: the "limited en banc court." The article concludes with brief
observations on the future of the Ninth Circuit and the three legislative
proposals introduced in the 106th Congress.
I. THE WHITE COMMISSION AND THE QUEST FOR "CORRECTNESS"

The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals (the "Commission") was created by an Act of Congress in late
1997. 7 The legislation originated as an alternative to bills that would
have effected an immediate split of the Ninth Circuit.8 Chief Justice
Rehnquist appointed the five members of the Commission in December
1997, and in January 1998 the members selected Justice White as their
chair. Over the next few months the Commission held hearings in
several cities; it also received extensive written submissions, mostly from
judges, but also from bar associations and lawyers.

'

Comments of the United States Department of Justice on the Tentative Draft Report
of the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Nov. 6,
1998), availableat http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/report/comments/DOJ.htm.
7 The legislation establishing the Commission was included in the Judiciary
appropriations bill. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111 Stat. 2440, 2491
(1997).
' For a brief account of the process that led to the passage of the legislation, see
Hellman, Unkindest Cut, supra note 2, at 378-80.
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In October 1998, the Commission circulated a draft report for public
comment. Included in the draft report was the recommendation that
Congress keep the Ninth Circuit intact but divide its court of appeals
into three largely autonomous "adjudicative divisions." The chief judge
of the Ninth Circuit, speaking for a majority of the judges of the court of
appeals, wrote to the Commission urging several modifications to the
proposed restructuring. The Commission emphatically rejected the
judges' suggestions. In doing so, the Commission made explicit the
central premise of its recommendation: "a smaller decisional unit can
more effectively maintain the coherence and correctness of the law of that
unit. 10
This response indicates that the Commission perceived two distinct
ways in which the Ninth Circuit's size has hampered the performance of
its "law declaring function."
The court has failed to maintain
consistency in the law of the circuit; it has also failed to correct decisions
that are erroneous.
Assertions of inconsistency in Ninth Circuit panel decisions have a
long history. More than twenty-five years ago, former Solicitor General
Erwin N. Griswold raised the subject in testimony before a predecessor
of the White Commission, the Commission on Revision of the Federal
Court Appellate System (the "Hruska Commission"). He said:
I formed the impression... that in the Ninth Circuit very little
attention was paid to the question of intra-circuit conflicts. The
judges of the Ninth Circuit who were assigned to a panel
endeavored to do justice in the case as they thought it appeared to
them, and they decided it. And we would frequently find another
panel ten days later deciding essentially the same question the other
way without any reference to the first case...."
Many similar statements can be found in the debates that preceded the
creation of the White Commission and in the record of the White
Commission's proceedings. Relying on these assertions and on its own
"experience," the White Commission concluded that "large appellate
units have difficulty developing and maintaining consistent and

' Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Tentative
Draft Report 39 (1998), available at http://app.comm.uscourts.gov.
" Final Report, supra note 2, at 51 (emphasis added).
" Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Hearings First
Phase 10 (1973) (testimony of Erwin N. Griswold).
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coherent law." 2
The Commission offered no empirical support for its judgment, and
indeed the available evidence is quite to the contrary. Over the years, I
have carried out a series of empirical research projects designed to
ascertain the nature and extent of inconsistency in Ninth Circuit panel
decisions." 14 That research does not support the Commission's
conclusion.

Perhaps recognizing the vulnerability of relying solely on assertions of
intracircuit inconsistency, the Commission also offered a more novel
justification for its proposed restructuring of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. The Commission argued that, with fewer judges, the semiautonomous adjudicative divisions would be able to "more effectively
maintain the ...correctness of the law of the unit."'Curiously, although the Commission referred repeatedly to the court
of appeals' responsibility for issuing decisions that are "correct," the
Commission never defined the standard by which "correctness" is to be
tested.
A reading of the report suggests two possibilities: the
"hierarchical" and the "horizontal." Under the hierarchical view, a panel
decision is incorrect if it diverges from the position ultimately taken by
the United States Supreme Court. Under the horizontal view, a panel
decision is incorrect if it departs from the position of a majority of the
judges of that "adjudicative unit."
Support for the hierarchical interpretation is found in the
Commission's references to letters it received from members of the
Supreme Court. The Commission pointed out that all four of the Justices

12

13

Final Report, supra note 2, at 47.
See Arthur D. Hellman, Breaking the Banc: The Common Law Process in the Large

Appellate Court, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 915, 941-65 (1991) [hereinafter Hellman, Breaking the Banc];
Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practiceof Precedent in the
Large Appellate Court, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 541, 544-51 (1989); see also Arthur D. Hellman,
Precedent, Predictability,and Federal Appellate Structure, 60 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1029, 1088-1107
(1999).
14 For a summary of the research, see Arthur D. Hellman, Dividing the Ninth Circuit:An
Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet Come, 57 MONT. L. REV. 261, 275-80 (1996) [hereinafter
Hellman, Dividing the Ninth Circuit]. The issue is also addressed in Hellman, Unkindest Cut,
supra note 2, at 397-401. In that article I called attention to evidence of inconsistency in the
decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, a court of only twelve judges. See
id. at 399. A recent analysis of Federal Circuit rulings on the doctrine of equivalents - an
important area of patent law - reinforces this point. See Paul E. Schaafsma, Court Offers
Mixed View of Equivalents Doctrine, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 16, 2000, at C26. The author concludes
that "given the current state of the court, a litigant's chance of success on appeal appears to
ride as much on the viewpoint of the Federal Circuit panel to which it is assigned as on the
merits of the case." Id.
13 Final Report, supra note 2, at 51 (emphasis added).
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who commented on the Ninth Circuit "were of the opinion that it is time
for a change." 16 The Commission then added: "We believe that our
divisional proposal addresses the Justices' concerns." Of particular
interest are the comments of Justice Scalia and Justice O'Connor. Justice
Scalia wrote:
[Tihe function of en banc hearings ... is not only to eliminate intracircuit conflicts, but also to correct and deter panel opinions that are
pretty clearly wrong .... The disproportionate segment of this
Court's discretionary docket that is consistently devoted to
reviewing Ninth Circuit judgments, and to reversing them by lopsided margins, suggests that this error-reduction function is not
being performed effectively.
Justice O'Connor spoke in a similar vein. In her letter to the
Commission she said, "It is important to the federal system as a whole
that the Courts of Appeals utilize en banc review to correct panel errors
within the circuit that are likely to otherwise come before the Supreme
Court." Citing statistics on en banc decisions and cases reviewed by the
Supreme Court, she added pointedly: "These numbers suggest that the
present system in [the Ninth Circuit] is not meeting the goals of en banc
review." 8
On the basis of this evidence, it would be plausible to conclude that
the Commission adopted the hierarchical view of correctness. However,
this interpretation is called into question by the testimony of Judge
Pamela Rymer, a member of the Commission, at a hearing of the Senate
Judiciary Committee. Judge Rymer, "representing and speaking in
behalf of" the Commission, told the committee that the Ninth Circuit's
record of reversals in the Supreme Court "is not a problem that the
Commission identified or that the Commission believes should weigh
into the consideration of structural alternatives one way or another." 9
If the Commission were measuring correctness by the positions of the
United States Supreme Court, the reversal rate would be highly relevant.
Judge Rymer's comments thus suggest that the Commission viewed

"

Id. at 38.

Letter from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice Byron R. White 1 (Aug. 21, 1998),
availableat http:/ /app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/submitted/pdf/Scalial.pdf
[hereinafter Scalia Letter].
IS
Letter from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to Justice Byron R. White 2 (June 23,1998),
available at http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/submitted/pdf/oconnor.pdf
[hereinafter O'Connor Letter].
" 1999 Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 59, 60-61 (statement of Hon. Pamela A. Rymer,
Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit).
'"
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correctness from a different perspective - the horizontal. Other language
in the report supports this interpretation. For example, the Commission
argued that its proposed restructuring would enable each adjudicative
unit to "more readily take cases en banc... that seem wrong to a
majority of the judges." 20 Further, in explaining why each division
should have its own en banc court, the Commission stated that the
function of "rectifying incorrect panel decisions" should be carried out in
such a way that "the entire body of judges for whom an en banc opinion
speaks should have a voice in that opinion." 21 The implication is that
what makes the panel decision "incorrect" is that it does not reflect the
views of "the entire body of judges for whom [the] opinion speaks."
For present purposes, there is no need to choose between these two
interpretations. Both arguments have loomed large in the debate over
restructuring the Ninth Circuit, and both raise important issues about
the Ninth Circuit's performance of "the law-declaring function" of an
appellate court. In Part II of this article, I look at the Ninth Circuit from
the "hierarchical" perspective. Part III addresses correctness in the
"horizontal" setting.
II. THE NINTH CiRcurr AND THE SUPREME COURT
In disclaiming reliance on the Ninth Circuit's record of reversals in the
Supreme Court, Judge Rymer departed from the approach taken by
many supporters of restructuring. Indeed, minutes after Judge Rymer
testified at the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, another Commission
member, Judge William D. Browning, sounded a very different note.
After acknowledging the "minimal importance" of the reversal rate,
Judge Browning continued:
[I]t is also true that the ninth circuit is the most reviewed circuit in
the country.... [I]t is the most reversed circuit in the country,

according to Judge Justice Scalia ....[I]t is the circuit reversed
unanimously by the U. S. Supreme Court the most; and it is the
circuit, when reversed, which draws the fewest dissents in the U. S.
Supreme Court. There is some message there. The message has
been out there for all to read and hear for years.22
More recently, Senator Orrin Hatch, chairman of the Senate Judiciary

0 Final Report, supranote 2, at 29.
21

Id. at 49.

' 1999 Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 129 (statement of Hon. William D. Browning,
United States District Judge).
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Committee, explicitly described the reversal rate as a problem that could
be dealt with through dividing the circuit:
Three terms ago, the Ninth Circuit's reversal rate before the U.S.
Supreme Court exceeded 95 percent. It is no cause for celebration to
note that during the last two terms, the Ninth Circuit reversal rate
averaged 77 percent, and this term I have noted that the Ninth
Circuit is not faring particularly well, with a record of 0 to 7 before
the Supreme Court. What is really wrong is there are literally
thousands of cases they hear that they are probably making the
wrong decisions on that will never go to the Supreme Court because
the Court doesn't have time to listen to thousands of cases from the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. So we are having all kinds of
injustice out there just because of judges who are out of control, who
are activist judges ignoring the law itself. I believe these problems
will be corrected when we streamline the circuit, leaving two more
manageable circuits in place to more carefully and exactingly do the
work currently undertaken by one.23
How should this line of argument be evaluated? The first question is
normative: should it be a matter of concern if a court of appeals has a
disproportionately high reversal rate?
The answer is yes.
In a
hierarchical system, it is not healthy when an intermediate court is
reversed repeatedly by the highest court in the structure. There are at
least two reasons for this.
One reason involves perception and
legitimacy. A pattern of reversals puts a personal cast on a process that
should be seen as transcending personalities; it may also raise doubts
about the competence or integrity of the intermediate court judges.
From a purely instrumental perspective, repeated reversals destabilize
the law by creating the impression that no decision of the court of
appeals can be relied upon until it has been tested in the Supreme Court.
The next question is whether critics are correct in asserting that "the
Ninth Circuit has a singularly... poor record on appeal" in the Supreme
Court.24 Although some defenders of the Ninth Circuit insist that the
record is not as bad as it appears,.2 their argument does not withstand
scrutiny. Two scholars have independently analyzed the reversals.
Professor Marybeth Herald focused on the notorious 1996 Term of the

146 CONG. REC. S1235 (daily ed. Mar. 7,2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
24 Letter of Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice Byron R. White 2 (Sept. 9, 1998), available at

http: / /app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings /submitted /pdf /Scalia2.pdf.
' See, e.g., Jerome Farris, The Ninth Circuit - Most Maligned Circuit in the Country- Fact
or Fiction?, 58 OHIo ST. L.J. 1465 (1997).
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Supreme Court, the Term in which the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit
in twenty-seven out of twenty-eight cases.26 She concluded:
The number of cases that the Supreme Court took for review in the
1996-97 Term from the Ninth Circuit was high. The percentage of
reversals was also high, as was the number of unanimous reversals.
In addition, many cases involved issues where the Ninth Circuit
decisions had no support from other courts of appeal. Some panels
of the Ninth Circuit were not synchronized with the Supreme Court
or fellow circuits. For all these reasons, the reversal rate and the
cases are hard to explain away.2
Professor Stephen L. Wasby sought to determine whether the 1996
Term represented an aberration or "spike." After looking at other
circuits and other Terms, he concluded: "Examined
in terms of the years
"
which preceded it, [the 1996 Term] was no 'spike. -2
But is the reversal rate a product of circuit size? That is a much
tougher question. Justice Scalia and Justice O'Connor draw the
connection by focusing on en banc review. As Justice Scalia sees it, one
function of en banc review is "to correct and deter panel opinions that
are pretty clearly wrong."2
But "the current size of the Circuit
discourages" en banc hearings, and the reversal rate "suggests that this
error-reduction function is not being performed effectively." 3° Justice
O'Connor has offered a similar analysis. She said, "It is important to the
federal system as a whole that the Courts of Appeals utilize en banc
review to correct panel errors within the circuit that are likely to
otherwise come before the Supreme Court."31 She continued by
contrasting the low number of cases heard en banc by the Ninth Circuit
with the much higher number of Ninth Circuit cases reviewed by the
Supreme Court.
At one level, this analysis is unquestionably accurate. Of the scores of

Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit,
and the Congress, 77 OR. L. REv. 405 (1998). There is some room for disagreement over the
precise numbers, but Professor Herald's count is certainly reasonable. See id. at 423-24.
Id. at 488.
Stephen L. Wasby, The Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court: Relations Between
Higher and Lower Courts 11 (1998) (unpublished paper prepared for delivery at the 1998
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association) (on file with author). In the
1999 Term, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in 9 out of 10 cases.
' Scalia Letter, supranote 17, at 1.
Id.
31

O'Connor Letter, supranote 18, at 2.

32

Id.
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Ninth Circuit decisions that the Supreme Court has reversed during the
last few years, only a handful were the product of en banc hearings.3
Thus, as a factual matter, it is true that the Ninth Circuit did not use en
banc review to correct the panel opinions that the Supreme Court viewed
as erroneous. Moreover, when the Ninth Circuit did take cases en banc,
its decisions fared quite well at the hands of the Justices. 34 But these facts
simply recast the question: why did the Ninth Circuit judges not make
use of the en banc process to address the errors in panel decisions that
resulted in reversals by the Supreme Court?
One possible answer is suggested by the White Commission report.
The Commission too questioned the effectiveness of en banc review in
"rectifying incorrect panel decisions" in the Ninth Circuit.- But it went
further, asserting that the size of the court makes it impossible for the
judges to monitor panel opinions and thus to identify the cases that
warrant en banc rehearing.3 To be sure, the Commission focused on
monitoring primarily as a device for preserving consistency within the
circuit. But it also emphasized the importance of monitoring as a tool for
"identify[ing] and correct[ing] any misapplication or misstatements of
the law." 37
The hypothesis, then, can be stated as follows. Because the Ninth
Circuit is so large, its judges cannot effectively monitor the opinions of
its many three-judge panels. Because monitoring does not operate as it
should, the court fails to grant en banc rehearing to correct panel rulings
that are erroneous. Instead, the cases are taken to the Supreme Court.
The Court overturns the panel decisions, thus bringing about the high
reversal rate.
To assess this argument, I begin by examining the procedures
available to Ninth Circuit judges for monitoring decisions by three-judge
panels and the use made of those procedures. Next, I compare the
results of the monitoring process with the pattern of reversals in the
Supreme Court. Finally, I consider the possible significance of recent
developments in both courts.

See infra section B.
See infra text accompanying notes 61-66.
Final Report, supra note 2,at 49.
Id. at 47.
3 Id.
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A. Opinion Monitoringand the En Banc Process in the Ninth Circuit
In the Ninth Circuit, as in other courts of appeals, cases are ordinarily
heard and decided by panels of three judges selected from among the
active judges of the court, senior judges, and visiting judges.3 Congress
has also authorized the court of appeals to hear or rehear cases "before
the court [en] banc." 9 En banc rehearing will be granted if a majority of
the active judges vote to do so. In other circuits, the en banc court
consists of all active judges. 4° The Ninth Circuit, acting under the
authority of a 1978 statute, convenes a "limited en banc court" (LEBC)
composed of the chief judge and ten other judges selected at random for
41
each case.
There are two ways of initiating the process that can lead to rehearing
by a limited en banc court. The party who lost at the panel level may file
a petition for rehearing en banc (PFREB).42 The petition is circulated to
all active judges and to senior judges who have chosen to participate in
the process. If any judge calls for a vote, a vote will be held, and if a
majority of the nonrecused active judges agree to rehearing, a limited en
banc court will be chosen from among the eligible judges. In the
alternative, a judge may call for a vote even though no party has
requested it.
It would be a mistake, however, to think that rehearing by the en banc
court is the only way in which Ninth Circuit judges can affect the
disposition of cases heard by panels on which they did not sit. On the
contrary, under the court's internal rules, off-panel judges can make use

See generally JuDrrH A. McKENNA, LAURAL L. HOOPER, & MARY CLARK, CASE
MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS (Federal Judicial Center

2000).
" 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1998). The statute uses the spelling "inbanc," as did the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure until the 1998 revision.
' Senior judges may sit on the en banc court if they served as a member of the panel
that decided the case. See id.
" For background on the 1978 legislation, see Arthur D. Hellman, Deciding Who
Decides: Understanding the Realities of Judicial Reform, 15 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 343, 346-51
(1990) [hereinafter Hellman, Judicial Reform]. For a detailed account of the deliberations
that led to the establishment of the limited en banc court, see Arthur D. Hellman,
Maintaining Consistency in the Law of the Large Circuit, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE 62-70
(Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990) [hereinafter Hellman, MaintainingConsistency].
' Until the 1998 amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, litigants
filed a petition for rehearing with a "suggestion" for rehearing en banc. For convenience, I
will use the current terminology even though most of the cases discussed in this article
were governed by the pre-1998 version of the rule.
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of several procedures for raising and pursuing questions about panel
decisions. They can "stop the clock." 43 They can "request 5.4(b) notice,"
thus requiring the three-judge panel to inform all judges of the
disposition of the petition for rehearing."4 And, of course, they can call
for rehearing by an en banc court. Each of these procedures may
generate an exchange of memoranda that can result in a modification of
the opinion or even of the disposition.
Stop-clocks, 5.4 requests, and en banc calls are treated as part of the en
banc process, and communications among the judges in these cases are
recorded in the court's monthly en banc report. In addition, judges may
communicate privately with panels; these communications will not be
reflected in the monthly report.
In the five years 1994 through 1998, off-panel judges initiated en banc
activity in more than 420 cases.4 The panel decisions that were the
subject of this monitoring spanned the full range of the court's docket.
They embraced civil appeals and criminal matters, high-profile cases and
cases notable only for their obscurity. Sometimes the off-panel judge
questioned the outcome, but in many instances the concern was limited
to reasoning, language, or even case citations in the panel decision. In
more than ninety cases the panel modified its opinion, and sometimes
banc.4
the outcome, even though the court did not hear the case en
A few examples will give a sense of the nature and extent of the
monitoring that goes on in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. To
preserve confidentiality, I have omitted some identifying details, but
even without that information we can see the kind of scrutiny that panel
opinions receive from off-panel judges.
0

A panel issued a unanimous decision in a habeas case. Ten

"Stopping the clock" is the name given by the court to the procedure that allows a
judge, without calling for an en banc vote, to extend for fourteen days the time limits for
issuing the mandate or taking other action in a pending case. See United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, General Orders 5.1(a)(7) and 5.4(e) (2000), available at
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov.
See Stephen Reinhardt, The Anatomy of an Execution: Fairnessvs. "Process", 74 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 313,328-29 (1999).
' This figure does not include cases in which en banc activity was initiated by one or
more members of the three-judge panel to which a case was assigned. Although these
initiatives contribute significantly to maintaining harmony in the law of the circuit, it is not
clear that they fall within the realm of "monitoring" as the White Commission envisioned
it. To be conservative, I have omitted them from the tally.
' This is a conservative figure. In some cases the panel modified its disposition, but
on the basis of the available information I could not determine whether the panel was
acting in response to an expression of concern by an off-panel judge.
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days after the filing of the opinion, an off-panel judge
requested 5.4 notice. The judge did not object to the panel's
results on any of the issues presented; he objected only to the
reliance on a Ninth Circuit decision that had recently been
overruled by the Supreme Court. The original opinion was
withdrawn before it reached the advance sheet, and a revised
opinion was issued.
*

In another habeas case, the panel found a constitutional
violation. An off-panel judge asked the panel to stay the
mandate to consider an amendment to the opinion. The panel
circulated a proposed amendment to the requesting judge.
The amendment made a single change: it replaced a statement
of a general proposition with a sentence focusing on the facts
of the particular case. The requesting judge said that he
appreciated the panel's accommodation of his concerns and
was withdrawing his stop clock. The prosecutor asked the
Supreme Court to review the case, but certiorari was denied.

"

A panel issued a unanimous opinion on a highly technical
issue of federal taxation. Two judges requested 5.4 notice, one
before the PFREB was circulated to the court, the other
afterwards. The panel issued an amended opinion that made
no changes in the result or the analysis; the only change was
the omission of language suggesting deference to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Both judges said their
concerns were satisfied by the revision.

*

In a suit by a trustee, a panel initially held that the defendant
was not an ERISA fiduciary and that the plaintiff's state law
claims were preempted. After the filing of a PFREB, an offpanel judge requested 5.4 notice. The judge argued in a
closely reasoned memorandum that the panel's opinion had
incorrectly analyzed the ERISA preemption issue. Another
judge said that he shared the initiating judge's concern.
Thereafter, the panel withdrew its opinion. The panel issued a
new opinion that adhered to the holding on fiduciary status
but reexamined the preemption holding and concluded that
the state law claims were not connected with ERISA and thus
were not preempted.
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"

In a brief per curiam opinion, a panel rejected a pro se
litigant's challenge to the district court's denial of leave to
proceed in forma pauperis. No PFREB was ever filed, but an
off-panel judge stopped the clock and asked the panel to
consider a small change in the opinion. The panel amended
the opinion to modify a one-paragraph reference to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The off-panel judge thanked
the panel for the change and withdrew his stop-clock.

*

In an appeal from a criminal conviction, an off-panel judge
expressed concern about the line of authority cited by the
panel on an alternate ground that did not affect the result. The
panel issued an amended opinion that modified the one
paragraph in question.

Other examples could be adduced, but there is no need to do so. The
research tells us that the problem - if there is a problem - does not lie in
the inability of judges on a large court to monitor the opinions handed
down by panels on which they do not serve. Contrary to the apparent
belief of the White Commission, 7 Ninth Circuit judges engage in
extensive monitoring of their colleagues' decisions.4 But the process has
not resulted in en banc rehearing of numerous panel decisions that the
Supreme Court has viewed as erroneous. Why not? To that question I
now turn.

' Although the White Commission briefly describes the operation of the limited en
banc court, see Final Report, supra note 2, at 32, the Commission's report makes no mention
of the various procedures, short of calling for en banc rehearing, that enable off-panel
judges in the Ninth Circuit to direct their colleagues' attention to panel opinions that may
warrant further consideration. Given the high value the Commission places on the
monitoring of panel decisions by court of appeals judges, this omission seems especially
strange.
' This finding also casts doubt on the relevance of a hypothesis recently advanced by
Judge Richard A. Posner. Judge Posner argued that "informal norms" are likely to be less
effective in keeping judges "in line" in a large circuit than in a small circuit. See Richard A.
Posner, Is the Ninth Circuit Too Large? A Statistical Study of Judicial Quality, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
711, 712 (2000). Whether or not that is so, this study shows that Ninth Circuit judges make
extensive use of formal mechanisms to keep their colleagues "in line."
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B. The En Banc Process and the Supreme Court
Although Ninth Circuit judges engage in extensive monitoring of
other panels' decisions, that monitoring has not led to the correction of
the "panel errors [that have therefore] come before the Supreme Court." 4
Why does the process fail? Do the judges not initiate en banc
consideration, or does the process stop short of en banc rehearing? Is
there a flaw in the mechanisms the Ninth Circuit has adopted, or are the
judges applying different criteria from those that guide the Justices in
reviewing and reversing Ninth Circuit decisions? To answer these
questions, it is necessary to undertake an empirical examination of the
relationship between the en banc process and the Supreme Court
reversals.
1. Two Sets of Cases
For this segment of the study, I have compared two sets of cases. One
set encompasses Ninth Circuit decisions that were reversed by the
Supreme Court. The second set embraces Ninth Circuit panel decisions
that were the subject of en banc activity within the court. I begin by
explaining how I selected the two sets of decisions for the study.
a. The Reversals
In the 1996 Term, as already noted, the Supreme Court reversed
twenty-seven out of twenty-eight Ninth Circuit decisions, including
eight that were reversed summarily. However, it would be wrong to
draw conclusions based on dispositions in a single Term. I therefore
decided to study the Court's treatment of Ninth Circuit cases over a
longer period of time. To assure that the analysis reflects current
conditions, I chose the five most recently completed Terms - 1994
through 1998.50
The "reversal" cases are the Ninth Circuit decisions that were accepted
for review by the Supreme Court during those five Terms5 and reversed
See supra text accompanying note 31 (quoting Justice O'Connor).
5'The 1999 Term was still in progress when I began the research.
51 Officially, the 1998 Term did not end until October 3, 1999; however, Court action
after the June 1999 adjournment is functionally part of the 1999 Term. On that basis, I
would have excluded the two Ninth Circuit cases in which review was granted in
September 1999. But one of these cases was the subject of an unsuccessful en banc vote in
1998; it would thus have been included in the "en banc activity" set. In the interest of
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summarily or after oral argument. 52 A case is counted as a reversal if the
judgment was reversed or vacated in whole or in part on the merits of
any issue.53 GVRs - cases in which the Court granted certiorari, vacated
the judgment, and remanded for reconsideration in light of a recent
precedent - are not treated as reversals.'
The "reversal" group encompasses eighty-four Ninth Circuit
decisions. Seventy-one decisions were reversed after oral argument and
thirteen were reversed summarily.5 During the study period the Court
granted certiorari in fourteen additional Ninth Circuit cases and
affirmed. One petition from the Ninth Circuit was dismissed and one
judgment was vacated without decision.
b. The En Banc Activity Cases
The cases accepted by the Supreme Court during the five Terms 1994
through 1998 would be those that received final disposition in the Ninth
Circuit during a somewhat earlier period. To examine the Ninth
Circuit's handling of cases that were candidates for Supreme Court
review in those five Terms, I have studied the record of en banc activity
during calendar years 1994 through 1998.
As explained in the preceding section, en banc activity in the Ninth
Circuit embraces a broad range of inter-judge communications. It
includes not only actual en banc calls and votes, but also "stop clocks"
and requests for 5.4 notice - in short, all efforts by members of the court
to initiate en banc proceedings, whatever the label. 56 During the five
simplicity, and to avoid any suggestion of undercounting, both cases were included in the
study.
5 Cases that were reversed in the 1994 Term but accepted for review in the 1993 Term
are not included. Four cases fit that description.
' Two cases in the Study Group arguably should not be counted as reversals. See
Unum Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999) (affirming on what appears to be principal
issue); Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121 (1997) (Rambo II) (affirming on
principal issue). In five other cases the Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit on at
least one substantial issue. See Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999); California Dental
Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 346-48 (1997); Koon v.
United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996); United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995).
On GVRs, see generally Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 165-175 (1996). (per
curiam); Arthur D. Hellman, The Supreme Court's Second Thoughts: Remands for
Reconsideration and Denials of Review in Cases Held for PlenaryDecisions, 11 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 5 (1983).
' Two Ninth Circuit decisions were reversed in a single Supreme Court opinion. See
United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997). They are counted as two cases because they
were heard by separate panels in the Ninth Circuit.
The category does not include communications from off-panel judges to panel
members that are not shared with all judges in accordance with the court's en banc
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years of the study the record of en banc activity embraced more than 450
appeals.
Although the correlation between the two groups of cases is not exact,
the temporal correspondence is very close.
I am confident that if a
reversal case generated any kind of en banc activity, the decision would
be included in the en banc activity records for the 1994-98 period.
2. A Gap in Perceptions
From the perspective of the en banc process, the Supreme Court
reversals can be divided into six groups. At one end of the spectrum are
the six cases that were heard and decided by a limited en banc court.
Remarkably, in all but one of these, the en banc court overturned the
panel decision in whole or in substantial part.s Thus, in the eyes of the
Supreme Court, it was the panel that "got it right" and the en banc court
that committed an error.6°
At first blush, it might appear that these decisions cast doubt on the
theory that the Ninth Circuit could avoid repeated reversal by the
Supreme Court if it heard more cases en banc. But the picture looks very
different when we put the six reversals in context. In the eight years
1991 through 1998, the Ninth Circuit heard a total of ninety-six cases en
banc.61 As often as not, the losing party accepted the en banc decision
and did not seek Supreme Court review. Certiorari petitions were filed
in only forty-eight of the cases, and only ten were accepted for review.
Of those ten, one decision was affirmed and six were reversed. 62 Three
others were vacated for reconsideration in light of plenary decisions that
in effect overruled the en banc decision. Thus, even when the GVRs are
procedures.
' This figure does include cases in which en banc activity was initiated by one or more
members of the three-judge panel to which a case was initially assigned. Although such
cases may not fall within the realm of "monitoring," they must be considered in assessing
the performance of the court as an institution.
' Only four of the reversals involved panel decisions that were handed down before
January 1, 1994. One of these cases was the subject of en banc activity in 1994, as were
more than thirty other panel decisions issued in 1993.
The only case in which the en banc court endorsed the result (and indeed the
opinion) of the three-judge panel was Yniguez v. Arizona, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (en
banc), rev'd sub nom. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
60 This group includes United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995).
The Supreme Court
agreed with the panel on both issues in the case; it agreed with the en banc court on one.
61 Data are available for this eight-year period,
and I see no reason not to take
advantage of that fact.
This figure includes one case that was summarily reversed. Roy v. Gomez, 81 F.3d
863 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub noma.California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2 (1996).
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included, the reversals account for not quite ten percent of the Ninth
Circuit's en banc cases over an eight-year period.
The record looks even more impressive when we consider some of the
en banc decisions that the Supreme Court declined to review. These
include four cases in which the en banc court overturned a state death
sentence on federal constitutional grounds.6 The vote in each instance
was six to five or seven to four. Given the Supreme Court's concerns
about the federalism implications of such cases, 64 one would have
expected the Court to intervene if the Justices thought the limited en
banc court had erred in ordering new trials. But the Court allowed the
decisions to stand.
I recognize that the Supreme Court - especially the current Court does not ordinarily take cases to correct error in the court below.6 But
the Court is willing to make exceptions when a federal court of appeals
has erroneously granted relief to a habeas petitioner. As the Court itself
said in one case where it summarily reversed the Ninth Circuit,
"[W]here, as in this case, a federal appellate court, second-guessing a
convict's own trial counsel, grants habeas relief on the basis of little more
than speculation with slight support, the proper delicate balance
between the federal courts and the States is upset to a degree that requires
correction."66 Against this background, it is legitimate to treat the denial
of certiorari in the cases I have mentioned as reflecting a conclusion that
the grant of habeas relief did not "require[] correction."
At the other end of the spectrum are nineteen cases - almost a quarter
of the total - in which the losing party in the Ninth Circuit did not seek
rehearing of the panel decision by the limited en banc court. Do these
cases tell us anything about the effectiveness of the en banc process? A
good argument can be made that they do not. The thrust of the
argument is that in an adversarial system, it is difficult to fault the offpanel judges for not pursuing the en banc process when the litigants
have not asked the court to do so. I believe that the argument is
persuasive.

See Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1033 (1998);
Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1133 (1998); McDowell
v. Calderon, 130 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1103 (1998); Jeffries v. Wood,
114 F.3d 1484 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997).
" Recall the now-classic opening line of Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in
one noteworthy death penalty habeas case: "This is a case about federalism." Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991).
See Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SuP. CT. REV.
403,430-31 (1997).
" Wood v. Bartholemew, 516 U.S. 1, 8 (1995) (emphasis added).
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It is true that Ninth Circuit judges do not necessarily rely on the
parties to call their attention to panel decisions that may warrant further
consideration within the court. In more than one-third of the cases that
were the subject of en banc activity during the study period, an off-panel
judge requested 5.4 notice or otherwise initiated the process before a
petition for rehearing en banc was filed. Moreover, sua sponte requests
accounted for about forty percent of the cases in which en banc review
was granted.67
On the other hand, judges who initiated en banc activity before the
filing of any petition for rehearing often did not pursue the cases if the
losing party chose not to seek rehearing en banc. There are ample
justifications for this behavior. Hundreds of PFREBs are filed each year,
and most of them plainly do not satisfy the criteria set forth in the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. A judge could reasonably assume
that if the deadline passes without the filing of a PFREB, the case
probably does not present an issue warranting reconsideration by a
limited en banc court.
This assumption is especially justifiable if the judge's reasons for
flagging the case involved apparent error in the panel opinion rather
than the possibility of conflict with some earlier Ninth Circuit decision.
The members of the court of appeals are in a unique position to identify
inconsistency or confusion in circuit law, and they may feel a special
responsibility to bring clarity to that law even when the parties to a
pending appeal have not found anything to complain about. But when
the concern is that a panel has deviated from the national law as laid
down by Congress and the Supreme Court, it makes sense for the judges
to rely primarily on the litigants to bring the error to their attention. This
is especially true when, as in a substantial majority of the reversal cases,
the losing party is the United States, a state government, or some other
repeat player. These entities are represented by able and experienced
counsel, and if the litigants do not seek en banc rehearing, the off-panel
judges can reasonably assume that the panel decision does not contain
error requiring correction within the court.
In this light, I believe the absence of en banc activity in reversal cases
in which no PFREB was filed generally does not reflect negatively on the.
effectiveness of opinion monitoring in the Ninth Circuit. There is one
exception: when the panel has followed circuit law as established in a
recent precedent that did generate an unsuccessful petition for rehearing

67 This figure includes cases in which en banc activity was initiated by one or more
members of the three-judge panel to which the case was originally assigned.
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en banc. That description fits two of the reversals in the study period.
This brings us to the reversals that most acutely raise the question of
the Ninth Circuit judges' sensitivity to panel error as perceived by the
Supreme Court: the cases in which the losing party sought en banc
rehearing but the court denied it. The cases fall into four groups:
*

In thirty-three cases, a petition for rehearing en banc6 was
filed with the court of appeals and presumably circulated to
all active judges, but no judge initiated en banc activity. No
judge stopped the clock; no judge requested a 5.4 notice.

*

In another thirteen cases, an off-panel judge stopped the clock
or requested a 5.4 notice, but the judge did not follow up. The
en banc report does not reflect that any memoranda were
exchanged or that any further en banc activity took place after
the initial announcement. 6

*

In five cases, an off-panel judge initiated en banc activity, and
one or more memoranda were exchanged, but the process
stopped short of a vote on rehearing en banc.

*

Finally, there were eight cases in which a judge requested a
vote on rehearing en banc and the vote was taken, but a
majority of the active judges did not vote in favor of rehearing.
In five of these there was a published dissent from the denial
of en banc review.

What stands out from these findings is that there is a wide gap
between the Supreme Court's perception of the Ninth Circuit panel
decisions that are both wrong and important and the perception of the
Ninth Circuit's own judges. In all but nineteen of the eighty-four cases
that the Supreme Court reversed, a petition for rehearing en banc was
circulated to the active judges of the court of appeals. But in half of those
cases, not a single judge asked other members of the court to take a
second look at the panel decision. In only nineteen cases did the PFREB

' As noted earlier, during this period the document was formally styled "petition for
rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en banc." See supra note 42.
In one reversal case, the losing party petitioned for certiorari shortly after the 5.4
notice was requested, cutting off further en banc activity. Thus the reversal does not
impugn the court's processes for addressing erroneous panel decisions.
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generate any exchange of memoranda within the court.7°
This gap in perceptions may help to explain the apparent belief of at
least some Supreme Court Justices that the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals is a court that cannot keep its house in order. Here are cases
that the United States Supreme Court thought worthy of review, either
as part of the shrunken plenary docket or among the even smaller
number of cases that receive summary disposition. Here are cases in
which the Supreme Court found - often without dissent - that the panel
had committed error. Yet the judges of the Ninth Circuit saw nothing in
the panel opinions that lifted them out of the mine run of appellate
dispositions.
3. Who Drops the Ball?
The analysis thus far points to a collective indifference on the part of
Ninth Circuit judges to panel error as perceived by the United States
Supreme Court. But there is another way of looking at the en banc
process that puts the Ninth Circuit in a somewhat more favorable light. I
have already mentioned that when the Ninth Circuit did take cases en
banc, the court's decisions fared quite well in the Supreme Court. Much
the same can be said of the en banc calls that failed. During the period of
the study, there were 102 cases in which a judge unsuccessfully called for
en banc rehearing of a panel decision.7' Memoranda were circulated
within the court, but the necessary votes did not materialize. In sixtythree of these cases the losing party filed a petition for certiorari in the
Supreme Court. n Only nine petitions were granted, and one resulted in
a judgment of affirmance. As already noted, eight decisions were
reversed. The remaining petitions were denied.
A similar pattern can be seen in the cases in which one or more
memoranda were circulated within the court but no vote was taken.
There were more than 150 such cases during the study period. More
often than not, the losing party accepted the Ninth Circuit's decision and
did not seek Supreme Court review, but certiorari petitions were filed in
almost sixty of the cases. Five of the Ninth Circuit's decisions were
reversed and one was vacated; in all of the others, review was denied.

' This figure includes the six cases that were heard by an en banc court as well as the
thirteen in which there was an exchange of memoranda or a vote that failed.
' This figure does not include one case in which the court rejected an en banc call
made by a panel before a decision was issued.
7 In one additional case the panel withdrew its decision before a certiorari petition
could be filed.
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These data suggest that when the Ninth Circuit judges focus their
collective attention on a panel decision, the probability is very high that
the outcome will be one that the Supreme Court will find at least
acceptable. The problem is that in so many cases no individual judge
ever initiates the process that leads to this next level of scrutiny.
4.... And Why?
What accounts for the failure of individual judges to flag the cases that
the Supreme Court later reversed?
One possible explanation is
suggested by Professor Herald's analysis of the reversals in the 1996-97
Term. Professor Herald concluded that the high reversal rate resulted
from an "ideological disagreement" between the Supreme Court and the
Ninth Circuit over how to resolve conflicts between government
interests and individual rights. 73 She elaborated:
The Supreme Court took cases where the Ninth Circuit had ruled
against the government's position. In reversing, the Supreme Court
generally ruled in favor of the government. The Ninth Circuit's
approach in the subsequently reversed cases was: (a) individuals
and individual rights prevail over the interests of the state and
federal governments; (b) the federal government prevails over
states' interests; and (c) the state generally loses, unless
environmental interests are at issue. The Supreme Court's approach
during the term was: (a) the states win; (b) the federal government
wins if the states do not have a conflicting interest; and (c)
individuals and individual rights generally lose unless real property
interests are at stake. 74
If Professor Herald is correct - and I believe that she is - this
"ideological disagreement" might also explain why Ninth Circuit judges
did not initiate en banc proceedings in so many of the reversal cases.
The theory would be that Ninth Circuit judges, unduly sympathetic to
claims of individual rights, turned a deaf ear when panels handed down
dubious decisions that rejected the position of a governmental litigant.
To test the hypothesis, I have compared the government cases that the
Supreme Court reversed with the government cases that were the subject
of en banc activity in the Ninth Circuit. "Government" cases are defined
as those in which the government - state or federal - is on one side and a
claim of individual rights is on the other side. "Individual rights"

Herald, supra note 26, at 489.
7 Id. at 410.
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embrace all assertions of rights or immunities against governments as
governments. 5 The "reversals" are, of course, the Ninth Circuit
decisions that the Supreme Court reversed during the five Terms of the
study. The en banc activity cases are the cases from the corresponding
calendar years in which (a) a member of the court stopped the clock,
requested 5.4 notice, or called for en banc rehearing 76 and (b) the court
voted on an en banc call or one or more memoranda were exchanged
among the judges.77
During the five Terms of the study the Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit in sixty-one government cases. The record of en banc
activity in the corresponding period encompasses more than 200
government cases. 9 Table 1 presents data on the two groups of
decisions.
The first thing that stands out is that the Supreme Court reversals were
heavily weighted in favor of governmental litigants. By far the largest
portion of the cases - half of the total - were brought to the Court by
state governments or their representatives.' ° Cases heard at the behest of
the federal government accounted for nineteen additional reversals."'
Reversals supporting the claimant were much less common. There were
only eight cases in which the Court ruled against the federal government

The category is not limited to constitutional cases; in particular, it includes appeals
arising out of federal criminal prosecutions and petitions filed by aliens challenging orders
of deportation. On the other hand, it excludes cases in which the government's position is
equivalent to that of a private litigant, e.g., suits against state or local governments under
Title VII or the Americans with Disabilities Act.
76 I did not include cases in which a panel called for en banc review before issuing a
decision. The purpose of the study is to ascertain, if possible, why Ninth Circuit judges did
not initiate en banc activity to correct panel decisions that the Supreme Court found to be
erroneous. When there is no panel error to correct, the existence of en banc activity is
largely irrelevant. In any event, sua sponte en banc calls by panels generally involved
apparent conflicts between earlier panel decisions.
' For this phase of the study, I excluded cases in which a member of the court stopped
the clock or requested 5.4 notice but did not follow up. While these procedures fall within
the category of "en banc activity," the absence of a supporting memorandum makes it
unlikely that other judges will actually focus their attention on the panel decision in
question.
Government cases thus accounted for almost three-quarters of the reversals during
the study period.
' For some Ninth Circuit cases, the available information was not sufficient for
classification. Thus the figures in the table slightly understate the extent of en banc activity
in one or more of the categories.
' The "state" includes political subdivisions and state officials litigating in their
official capacity.
Al As previously noted, this tally treats United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997), as
two cases. See supra note 55.
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Table 1
Supreme Court Reversals and
Ninth Circuit En Banc Activity in
"Government" Cases 1994-1998*
Type of Case

Supreme Court Reversals

Ninth Circuit En Banc
Activity

Federal government case;

8

77

19

48

4

51

30

38

61

214

government prevailed in 9th
Circuit

Federal government case;
individual prevailed in 9th Circuit

State government case;
government prevailed in 9th
Circuit

State government case; individual
prevailed in 9th Circuit.

Total government cases

As noted in the text, the "en banc activity" cases are limited to those in which at
least one memorandum was circulated within the court.
**N
my be slightly low. See text
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and only four in which state governments were on the losing side. The
Court's behavior during the period of the study thus reflects the same
patterns that Professor Herald identified in the 1996-97 Term.
When we look at en banc activity in the Ninth Circuit, however, we
find that the picture is more complex. Consistent with the pattern
observed by Professor Herald in the cases that the Supreme Court
reversed, Ninth Circuit judges challenged numerous panel opinions that
favored government interests over individual rights. But Ninth Circuit
judges were also attentive to cases in which panels ruled against the
government.
In fact, the raw numbers probably overstate the tilt toward individual
rights in the en banc process. For one thing, almost one-third of the cases
in which judges challenged panel decisions favoring state governments
were cases in which the panel had upheld a sentence of death. It is
understandable that the judges would give special scrutiny to rulings
which, if not modified, represent the last step on the road to execution. 82
But only five of those cases resulted in overturning the death sentence,
and the Supreme Court denied certiorari in all but one of the five.8
More important, although we do not have hard data, we can be
confident that panel decisions rejecting individual rights claims far
outnumbered panel decisions that favored the individual. Thus it is
quite possible that the overall tilt favoring intervention in progovernment decisions reflected only the predominance of those cases in
the court's dispositions as a whole. We see this particularly in the cases
involving the federal government. Affirmances of criminal convictions a staple of the business of the courts of appeals - accounted for more
than half of the cases in which judges raised questions about a panel
opinion.
Further analysis of the en banc activity would no doubt be
enlightening, but for purposes of testing the hypothesis I do not think it
is necessary. If the failure of Ninth Circuit judges to flag the panel
decisions that the Supreme Court reversed was attributable to
"ideological disagreement," we would expect to find that en banc
activity was overwhelmingly concentrated in cases where panels rejected

See Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 569 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting)
("[Hiowever true it is that the en banc rehearing process cannot effectively function to
review every three-judge panel that arguably goes astray in a particular case, surely it is
nonetheless reasonable to resort to en banc correction that may be necessary to avoid a
constitutional error standing between a life sentence and an execution.").
The exception was the notorious case of Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir.
1997) (en banc), rev'd, 523 U.S. 538 (1998).
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individual rights claims. That simply is not what the data show. Judges
flagged many cases in which panels ruled against the government. But,
more often than not, these were not the cases that the Supreme Court
chose to review and reverse. And even when the judges did flag the
cases, their actions generally did not lead to en banc reconsideration.
C. A PassingPhenomenon?
The data tell us that Ninth Circuit judges engaged in extensive
monitoring of panel opinions during the period of the study. In the
course of that monitoring, the judges initiated en banc consideration in
numerous cases of the kind that the Supreme Court has frequently
reviewed and reversed. But more often than not, the cases that did
attract the Supreme Court's interest fell below the radar of the court of
appeals judges. Why? The available data do not give us an answer to
that question.
Perhaps further analysis of the cases would reveal one or more
patterns that would explain the gap in perceptions. Be that as it may,
there is some evidence that the high number of reversals in the 1994-98
period may reflect a transient phenomenon that has now come to an end.
During the five years of the study, the Supreme Court granted plenary
review to eighty-seven Ninth Circuit cases, an average of seventeen per
Term. The reversal rate was about eighty percent. In addition, the Court
summarily reversed thirteen Ninth Circuit decisions, all but five of them
in the 1996 Term. But in the 1999 Term the Court heard only ten cases
from the Ninth Circuit. All but one were reversed. There were no
summary reversals.8
It may not be coincidence that during the last few years the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals has substantially increased the number of cases
it has taken en banc. Table 2 provides the data. In the three years 1993
through 1995, the total number of cases heard or reheard en banc was
only twenty-two. In the last three years of the 1990s, the court was
accepting almost that number every year.6 Several of the panel

I emphasize that this research does not cast doubt on Professor Herald's conclusions
that "ideological disagreement" exists and that it helps to account for the high reversal rate.
But "ideological disagreement" does not explain the Ninth Circuit's failure to use the en
banc process to avert the reversals.
At this writing (after the issuance of the October order lists), the Court has accepted
twelve Ninth Circuit cases for argument in the 2000 Term. Only six of the petitions were
filed by governmental litigants.
The pattern has continued into the new millenium. As of October 15, 2000, the court
had already granted en banc review in seventeen cases.
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Table 2
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Cases Taken En Banc
1991-1999

Year

Total

No. of Cases

No. of Cases

Ballots

Rejected

Accepted

1991

22

14

8

1992

38

22

16

1993

29

23

6

1994

32

24

8

1995

27

19

8

1996

25

11

14

1997

41

22

19

1998

44

27

17

1999

40

21

19

decisions that were overturned by the en banc court would have been
prime candidates for review and reversal by the Supreme Court if the
panel outcome had been allowed to stand. 7 Thus, it appears that,

See, e.g., United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 170 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding
that Vienna Convention on Consular Relations creates individual right enforceable through
suppression of evidence), on reh'g, 206 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (rejecting
suppression remedy); Lambright v. Stewart, 167 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 1999) (reversing
convictions in capital cases because state used dual juries), on reh'g, 191 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir.
1999) (en banc) (upholding convictions); Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 165 F.3d 667 (9th
Cir. 1999) (allowing plaintiffs to pursue class action alleging violations of Fourth
Amendment by Border Patrol), on reh'g, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (affirming
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contrary to its practice during the period of the study, the Ninth Circuit
is now using its en banc process to bring its jurisprudence closer to the
views of the Supreme Court.8
The number of reversals may, of course, rise once again to the levels
experienced in the middle years of the 1990s. But even if it does, that
would not support the restructuring proposed by the Commission. The
Commission relies on its belief that judges on a large court of appeals
cannot adequately monitor the opinions handed down by panels on
which they do not sit. The research reported here shows that, at least as
to the Ninth Circuit, that belief is unfounded.8 9

Ill. THE LARGE COURT AND ITS PANELS
Thus far I have been examining the Ninth Circuit's performance of the
error correction function on the premise that "error" in a panel decision
means: erroneous in light of the position ultimately taken by the United
States Supreme Court. That is undoubtedly the meaning given to the
term by Justice Scalia and Justice O'Connor. It is probably what the
Justice Department had in mind as well.90
However, the White
Commission appears to have been addressing a very different point. The
Commission emphasizes that under its proposed structure - but not
under any form of limited en banc - "issues of exceptional importance
will be determined by all of the judges for whom the decision speaks." 91

grant of summary judgment to defendants); United States v. Kaluna, 152 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir.
1998) (holding federal "three strikes" law unconstitutional), on reh'g, 192 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir.
1999) (en banc) (upholding law), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1561 (2000).
' Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, speaking at the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference in
August 2000, said it is "possible" that the Ninth Circuit's "use of more en banc procedures"
is responsible for the diminished number of Ninth Circuit cases accepted for review by the
Supreme Court. See Jason Hoppin, O'Connor Grades Circuit, RECORDER (San Francisco),
Aug. 23,2000, at 1.
Judge Richard Posner recently published an empirical study using summary
reversals by the Supreme Court to test the hypothesis that the size of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals has impaired the quality of the court's work. He concluded that "the
Ninth Circuit's uniquely high rate of being summarily reversed by the Supreme Court (a) is
probably not a statistical fluke and (b) may not be a product simply of that circuit's large
number of judges." Posner, supra note 48, at 719. I am very dubious about a research
method that places so much weight on a phenomenon that encompasses only thirty-nine
cases from all circuits over a period of thirteen years. But the conclusion drawn by Judge
Posner from the research is sufficiently equivocal that I need not pursue the matter here.
For criticism of Judge Posner's method, see Chief Judge Procter Hug, Jr., PotentialEffects of
the White Commission's Recommendations on the Operationof the Ninth Circuit, 34 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 325 (2000).
' See supra text accompanying note 6.
91 Final Report, supra note 2, at 51 (emphasis added).
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Together with an earlier reference to rectifying "aberrant" decisions,92
this passage suggests that decisions are erroneous if they are contrary to
the position of a majority of the judges in the decisional unit.
Although the Commission does not elaborate on this "horizontal"
perspective, others have done so. The assumption, as Judge Douglas H.
Ginsburg has written, is that "the majority should rule; that is, the
decisions of the panels ideally should reflect the views of the court as a
whole, or where that is not possible because the court is divided, come as
close as possible to that ideal by reflecting the views of a majority of the
court." 93 Judge Ginsburg explicitly defines "panel error" as "divergence
from the views of the majority of the circuit judges."94 Thus, the full
court "can and should convene en banc whenever the majority believes
that [a panel's] error is grave enough to warrant the cost of correction,
regardless of whether the case would fall under a neutral category of
exceptional importance."95
In contrast to the hierarchical principle, the norm of majority rule is
not universally accepted. Particularly in the Ninth Circuit, many judges
are committed to a competing principle - the principle of panel
autonomy.96 These judges believe that as long as a new decision does not
conflict with binding precedent, panels should be given wide leeway to
resolve issues, even important ones, on which there is no controlling
authority. They believe that the best corrective for aberrant panels
decisions generally will not be found in immediate en banc review, but
in the evolutionary processes of law over time.9
The White Commission's apparent rejection of the panel autonomy
model raises fundamental issues about the role of individual judges in a
geographically organized system of intermediate appellate courts. But
there may be no need to address these issues if the Commission's
assessment of the unique aspects of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
proves unpersuasive. I therefore turn to that diagnosis.

Id. at 30.
Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The Court En Banc: 1981-1990, 59 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 1008, 1034 (1991).
Id.at 1009.
Id. at 1041.
See Annual Judicial Conference, Second Judicial Circuit of the United States, 106
F.R.D. 103, 162 (1984) (remarks of Judge James R. Browning) [hereinafter Browning
Remarks].
See id. at 161-62.
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A. The Limited En Banc Court in the Ninth Circuit: The Record
The White Commission appears to identify two ways in which the
existing arrangements in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals frustrate the
ideal of majority rule. One involves the frequency of en banc rehearing.
The second involves the use of a limited en banc court (LEBC).
At the outset of its discussion of the Ninth Circuit, the Commission
asserts that smaller decisional units "may... more readily take cases en
banc ...that seem wrong to a majority of the judges." 98 The implication
is that the Ninth Circuit today too seldom grants en banc rehearing when
panels hand down decisions that a majority of the full court views as
erroneous. The Commission offers no evidence on this point, and it is
difficult to see how the proposition might be tested. What we do know
is that the members of the court vote on en banc rehearing if even one
judge requests that balloting take place. Perhaps some judges vote "no"
(or fail to call for en banc in the first place) for reasons related to size.
However, it is equally possible that the judges stay their hand because
they agree with the panel decision or because they believe that the panel
opinion, although perhaps erroneous, is not important enough to
warrant en banc correction." It is also worth noting that in the last three
years the court has granted en banc review in substantially more cases
°°
than in the three years that preceded the creation of the Commission.&
In this light, I see no reason to pursue the argument - if indeed the
Commission makes the argument - that the size of the Ninth Circuit has
frustrated majority rule by unduly diminishing the frequency of en banc
rehearing.
I turn, rather, to an argument that the Commission
undoubtedly makes: that when Ninth Circuit does grant en banc
rehearing, the limited en banc court does not adequately reflect the
views of the judges for whom the en banc opinions speak.
The Commission's concern about the representativeness of the limited
en banc court is widely shared. For that reason, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals Evaluation Committee consulted Professor David Kaye, a
noted expert on statistics and the law."1 Professor Kaye calculated the

' Final Report, supra note 2, at 29.
" Even in smaller circuits, judges do not necessarily call for en banc simply because
they disagree with a panel opinion. See Patricia M. Wald, Changing Course: The Use of
Precedent in the Districtof Columbia Circuit, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 477, 483 (1985-86) (stating
that on District of Columbia Circuit, "en bancs are not undertaken lightly; the initiating
judge must feel deeply that circuit jurisprudence is significantly threatened to call for an en
banc").
1 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
101 The primary focus of the Evaluation Committee was on the question whether to
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probability that the outcome of a vote in the eleven-judge LEBC will
match the outcome that would be reached if all 28 active judges were
participating. He concluded that if the number of judges in the
hypothetical majority on a court of twenty-eight judges is seventeen or
more, there is an eighty percent probability that the LEBC will decide the
case the same way. But if the full court would be closely divided, the
probability of the same outcome diminishes. 1°2
Professor Kaye's analysis provides at best a partial counter to the
Commission's expressions of skepticism about the effectiveness of the
limited en banc court.' 3 Moreover, a statistical approach necessarily
addresses the question in a rather abstract way. I have therefore chosen
a more concrete method, one that looks at the actual operation of the en
banc court. Specifically, I have sought to determine whether rehearing
by a limited en banc court generally results in reversing the decision
handed down by the three-judge panel. If it does, this is some evidence
that the en banc process is working as it should.
The premise is that judges who vote for en banc rehearing generally
believe that the panel decision is wrong, or at least that it is open to
serious question. There are exceptions, notably when the en banc call
asserts an intracircuit conflict and does not dwell on the error of the
panel opinion, but my research shows that such situations are rare.10
Thus, if the en banc court reaches the opposite result from that of the
panel, this generally indicates that the judges who voted for en banc
would find the outcome to be satisfactory. And since those judges
would normally constitute a majority of the active judges, we can take

increase the number of judges on the limited en banc court. See David R. Thompson, The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Evaluation Committee, 34 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 365 (2000).
"
Letter from Prof. David H. Kaye, Arizona State University College of Law, to Hon.
Mary Schroeder 1 (May 14, 1999) (on file with author).
"0 It does, however, deflect a point made by Judge Posner. Judge Posner argues that "a
three-judge panel that decides to... go out on a thin limb has a reasonable prospect of
getting away with it" in the Ninth Circuit because even if rehearing en banc is granted, "the
luck of the draw may result in an en banc panel's being dominated by the original panel's
members and their allies." Posner, supra note 48, at 712. To say that a panel has gone out
on a "thin limb" is to say that the panel decision is highly aberrant. If so, the panel could
not reasonably expect that an eleven-judge LEBC would ratify its decision. And the
thinner the limb, the higher the probability (actual and perceived) that the LEBC will saw it

off.

o104When an en banc call is directed at a panel opinion, the memoranda in support of
rehearing almost invariably argue that the panel opinion is erroneous. This is so even
when one or more supporting memoranda also assert that the opinion creates an
intracircuit conflict. See Hellman, MaintainingConsistency, supra note 41, at 74-75. En banc
review aimed at eliminating a preexisting intracircuit conflict typically is the product of a
panel's sua sponte en banc call. See Hellman, Unkindest Cut, supra note 2, at 387-88.
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this as evidence that the en banc ruling does reflect at least the
preliminary views of the full court.
How does the Ninth Circuit's limited en banc court fare when
measured in this way? To find out, I looked at all of the cases that were
accepted for en banc review from January 1, 1994, through September 30,
1999.1°5 The total number of cases was seventy-seven. However, nine of
the cases were taken en banc at the request of a panel before the panel
issued its decision. Thus there is no panel ruling to compare with the en
banc decision. In another three cases, the en banc court did not reach the
merits; it dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction or sent the case
back to the panel. Again, comparison is not possible.
This gives us sixty-five cases in which we can compare panel outcome
with en banc outcome. The results are summarized in Table 3. In fortythree cases, the panel outcome was unequivocally reversed. In six other
cases, the reversal was not quite as unequivocal, but the outcome did
change. Further, in each of the six cases there are particular reasons for
believing that the en banc outcome would satisfy the judges who
challenged the panel decision.10' Thus, in forty-nine of the sixty-five
cases, we can say with some confidence that the en banc result did reflect
the will of the majority as manifested in the vote to take the case en
banc.7 It is also noteworthy that in all but five of the cases the vote to
reverse the panel outcome was seven to four or better.ca

1
I chose the cutoff date of September 30, 1999, because, at the time I carried out the
research, en banc decisions had been issued in all cases in which rehearing had been
granted as of that date.
" For example, in one case the en banc majority opinion was authored by the judge
who called for en banc. In another case the en banc majority opinion was written by the
panel dissenter. The judge who called for en banc joined the opinion.
17 I recognize that this research does not tell us whether a majority of the full court
would have endorsed the analysis or rationale of the limited en banc court, as
distinguished from its outcome. Analysis and rationale are important, but, even more than
the outcome, they are subject to the evolutionary processes of our system of precedent. See
infra text accompanying notes 142-147.
Im In one of the cases that I have counted as 6-5, there were actually nine votes to reject
the panel outcome, but only six judges rejected the panel holding. See Lopez v. Smith, 203
F.3d 1122, 1133, 1134 & n.1 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Rymer, J., concurring).
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Table 3
Comparison of
Limited En Banc Outcome and Panel Outcome
(Cases Taken En Banc Jan. 1, 1994 - Sept. 30, 1999)
Limited En Banc Outcome

Number of cases

Panel result reversed; vote is 11-0

12

Panel result reversed;vote is 10-1

6

Panel result reversed; vote is 9-2

5

Panel result reversed;vote is 8-3

9

Panel result reversed; vote is 7-4

12

Panel result reversed; vote is 6-5

5

Panel result sustained;vote is 11-0

7

Panel result modified; acceptability to full court

5

unclear
Panel result sustained;vote is 6-5 (3 cases) or 7-4

4

Total

65

In seven additional cases, the LEBC reached the same result as the
panel, but in a decision that was unanimous. Statistically, the absence of
dissent by any of the eleven randomly chosen judges is strong evidence
that the result represented the views of the full court. But we need not
rely on statistical inferences alone. In all but two of the cases, the
opinion of the LEBC was joined by one or more of the judges who wrote
in support of en banc rehearing. In one case where no requesting judge
joined the en banc opinion, the LEBC retreated substantially from the
breadth of the panel holding. Also, in each instance, the LEBC included
appointees of both Republican and Democratic presidents.
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On the basis of this analysis, there is every reason to believe that in at
least six of the seven cases, the unanimous ruling by the LEBC did reflect
the position of a majority of the active judges. When we add these to the
forty-nine cases in which the LEBC reached the opposite result from that
of the panel, we have accounted for fifty-five of the sixty-five en banc
rulings.
The remaining cases require individual discussion. In four cases, the
evidence suggests that the LEBC reached a result contrary to the one the
full court would have endorsed.
*

Yniguez v. Arizona'09 is the clearest example.
The case
presented a novel issue; the only reason to grant rehearing en
banc was that the panel "got it wrong." But the limited en
banc court, in a six to five decision, not only reaffirmed the
result reached by the three-judge panel; it issued an opinion
that was almost identical to the panel opinion." °

*

In United States v. Doe,' the en banc court, by a vote of six to
five, reaffirmed the principal holdings of the three-judge
panel. There is no hint in the opinion of an intracircuit
conflict, and the majority does not repudiate any circuit
precedent. In all likelihood, the judges who voted for en banc
review did so because they thought the panel had erred.
112

*

In Taylor v. United States, the three-judge panel held that
section 802 of the Prison Litigation Reform Act violates
separation of powers principles. It thus affirmed the district
court's denial of the state's motion to terminate a consent
decree. On rehearing, the LEBC reached the same result by a
vote of six to five."' The holding of the court rested on

10 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc). For the subsequent history of the case, see infra
note 110.
"I The Supreme Court reversed on procedural grounds and did not reach the merits of

the First Amendment issue that divided the en banc court. Arizonans for Official English
v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997). Soon afterwards, the Supreme Court of Arizona endorsed
the position of the Ninth Circuit en banc majority and held that the Arizona ballot initiative
violated the First Amendment. The United States Supreme Court declined to review the
case. Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
11 155 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
112 143 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir.), opinion withdrawn on grant of reh'g, 158 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir.
1998).
1

Taylor v. United States, 181 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
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grounds of mootness; five of the six judges also agreed that
application of the statute to the case would be
unconstitutional.14 It is highly doubtful that the judges who
voted for en banc - a majority of the court - would have been

satisfied with this outcome.
In United States v. Quails,"' the court granted rehearing en banc
"to determine whether our prior decision in United States v.
Dahms should be overturned." 1 6 But the LEBC, by a vote of

seven to four, held that Dahms was correctly decided. Here it
is at least possible that some judges voted for en banc review
on the theory that a precedent rejected by three other circuits" 7
should be reconsidered whether or not the decision appears to
be correct. But there is no evidence one way or the other.
In the remaining five cases, the available information is ambiguous as
to whether the en banc decision likely represented the views of a
majority of the full court:
*

In Vizcaino v. Micrososoft Corp.,"8 the limited en banc court
divided three ways. The lead opinion did not reject the
plaintiffs' claim, as the panel dissent would have done, nor
did it order entry of judgment for the plaintiffs, as did the
panel majority. We can only speculate as to whether some or
all of the judges who voted for en banc rehearing would have
been satisfied with this partial reversal of the panel outcome.

*

In Kearney v. Standard Insurance Company,"9 an ERISA case, the
en banc court was even more badly fragmented. On one issue
(the standard of review) a majority agreed with the threejudge panel. 20 On a second issue (the scope of review) a

.14Neither the United States nor the state of Arizona filed a certiorari petition in the
Supreme Court. Both had sought en banc rehearing of the panel decision.
115 140 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
16
Id. at 825.
117 See id. at 831 (Hall, J., concurring) (citing cases).
118 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1098 (1998).
119 175 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 398 (1999).
1
See id. at 1087-90 (agreeing with panel that review by court is de novo, without
deference to insurer's decision).
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majority repudiated the panel holding. 121 Moreover, according
to the lead opinion, the court granted en banc rehearing to
eliminate a conflict between two panel decisions. Thus, some
judges may have voted for en banc review even though they
thought the panel opinion was correct.

121

*

In Rand v. Rowland,'22 the en banc court overruled one element
of the "pro se prisoner fair notice" rule, but by a vote of six to
five left the rule itself in place. We have no way of knowing
whether some of the judges who voted for en banc would
have been satisfied by the partial overruling of the precedents
that the panel followed. 12 A further complication is that two
members of the six-judge majority concurred on grounds of
stare decisis, noting that "the litigants before us have not
raised an objection to the continued vitality of [the underlying
rule]." 24 Some of the judges who voted for en banc might have
been equally reluctant to reconsider a precedent that the state
did not challenge.' 25

*

In United States v. Perez,'26 two circumstances cloud the
analysis. First, there was an apparent intracircuit conflict, so
that some judges may have voted for en banc review even
though they agreed with the panel's decision to reverse the
conviction. Second, the en banc court affirmed the conviction,
thus changing the result; however, it adopted a narrow view
of "invited error" that probably would not have satisfied the
judges who viewed the panel decision as erroneous. Five
members of the LEBC disagreed with the analysis adopted by
the majority.

See id. at 1090-91 (holding, contrary to panel, that district judge did not abuse his

discretion in limiting scope of review to evidence that was before insurer).
12 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
12 A request was made for full-court en banc rehearing in Rand; however, a majority of
the active judges voted against the request.
Rand, 154 F.3d at 964 (Thomas, J., concurring).
1
At the time of voting on the en banc call, the judges probably assumed that, if the
case was heard by an en banc court, the state would challenge the validity of the underlying
rule. Of course, the state would not have done so in its arguments to the three-judge panel,
which would have been bound to follow circuit precedent.
116 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
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In Lopez v. Thompson,1 27 the three-judge panel held that a statecourt criminal defendant knowingly waived his right to
counsel and chose self-representation. The en banc court
agreed by a vote of nine to two. "8 But the LEBC disavowed
Ninth Circuit decisions that appeared to require state trial
1
courts "to engage in a specific colloquy with the defendant." 29
Those decisions were heavily relied on by the panel
dissenter."3 It is quite possible that some judges voted for en
banc because they agreed with the dissenter that circuit law
had gone astray, not because they quarreled with the panel's
outcome.

Although it is difficult to generalize about these five cases, one
common thread is that the limited en banc court cut back in some way on
the panel decision. In Perez, the outcome changed; in the other cases the
LEBC repudiated one or more elements of the panel holding.
Additionally, in Kearney, Perez, and Lopez, judges might have voted for
an en banc rehearing to clarify circuit law even if they agreed with the
outcome of the panel decision. Rand presents the further wrinkle that no
litigant urged the overruling of the precedent that was central to the
grant of en banc review.
Under these various combinations of
circumstances, it is quite possible that a majority of the active judges
would have decided the cases in the same way that the limited en banc
courts did, but we simply do not know.
It appears, therefore, that the available information does not enable us
to measure with confidence the extent to which LEBC decisions have
departed from majority rule. Looking at the data in the worst possible
light, we cannot rule out the possibility that departures occurred in as
many as nine out of sixty-five cases. However, other information that we
do have suggests a more benign view of the process.
In all but one or two of the nine cases I have discussed, the limited en
banc court was closely divided or badly fragmented. 3 '
These
'- 175 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 1999) (Lopez I), opinion withdrawn on grant of reh'g, Lopez v.
Thompson, 187 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 1999).
Lopez v. Thompson, 202 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Lopez II).
12 Id. at 1117.
See Lopez I, 175 F.3d at 1129 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (criticizing "this court's
formalistic approach" but noting that "a three-judge panel doesn't have the power to
reverse the circuit's course"). Of course the en banc court was not bound by prior panel
decisions.
131 Reasonable people can differ as to whether a 7-4 split (as in Qualls) should be treated
as a "close" division in this context.
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circumstances call into question the assumption that the judges who
voted for rehearing on the basis of the panel opinion would necessarily
disagree with the en banc opinion that reached a similar result. Justice
Stephen Breyer commented recently on the difference between thinking
about a question in the abstract and thinking it through "for real":
Until [an issue] comes up, I don't really think it through with the
depth that it would require.... So often, when you decide a matter
for real, in a court or elsewhere, it turns out to be very different after
you've become informed and think it through for real than132what
you would have said at a cocktail party answering a question.
Considering a petition for rehearing en banc is not like answering a
question at a cocktail party, but neither is it like studying the record,
studying the briefs, and writing or commenting on a draft opinion. And
the judges who are not on the panel have not done any of those things.
When the en banc court - composed of judges selected at random divides six to five or seven to four, this suggests that the issue itself is a
close one.lu So too when the court is fragmented. And the closer the
issue, the more likely it is that "think[ing] it through for real" might lead
a judge to a different conclusion than the one he or she reached on the
basis of the materials available at the time of the en banc vote.
B. The Role of Majority Rule in a Multi-Judge Court
On the basis of the preceding analysis, I conclude that, far more often
than not, decisions of the limited en banc court in the Ninth Circuit do
reflect the position of a majority of the court's active judges. At the same
time, I would not deny that, almost certainly, some departures from
majority rule have occurred. I therefore turn to the normative question:
how troubling is it that in some instances the limited en banc court has
handed down an "aberrant" ruling - a ruling that the full court would
repudiate if all active judges participated in the decision of the case?
In the conventional view, minority control of en banc outcomes would
probably be regarded as inconsistent with the purpose of en banc
review. Not long after Congress adopted the legislation authorizing en
banc proceedings, Justice Felix Frankfurter commented that "insofar as

32 Stephen Breyer, Supreme Court Issues, Remarks at Harvard Law School (Dec. 10,
1999) (unofficial transcript on file with author).
1
I would not make this statement about close decisions in the Supreme Court. In the
Supreme Court, 5-4 decisions often reflect well-established fissures on recurring issues
such as state sovereign immunity.
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possible, determinations en banc are indicated whenever it seems likely
that a majority of all the active judges would reach a different result than
the panel assigned to hear a case or which has heard it."'3 Supporters of
13
the "majority rule" approach quote this language with approval.'
However, as commentator Phil Zarone has pointed out, Justice
Frankfurter was addressing the situation where en banc rehearing would
avert a conflict between panel decisions. 38 He was not arguing generally
for majoritarian rule in the courts of appeals. 37
Further, it was also Justice Frankfurter who admonished us that we
Majority rule is a
should not confuse the familiar with the necessary.
familiar characteristic of courts like the United States Supreme Court that
always sit en banc, but is it a necessary feature of multi-judge courts that
generally hear cases in panels of three?
Historically, it has not been so. A few years ago, Professor Daniel J.
Meador, who later served as executive director of the White
Commission, described the operation of the Court of Appeal in
England.' 39 That court, which hears both civil and criminal appeals, was
then composed of twenty-six Lord Justices of Appeal and two presiding
judges. The court decided cases in panels of three judges. There is no
mention in Professor Meador's account of any provision for rehearing en
banc, and it does not appear that anyone was bothered by the prospect
that panel decisions would not necessarily reflect the position of the
majority within the court.
Admittedly, this arrangement may be more tolerable in England than
it would be here, because appellate judges in England pay less attention
to precedent than do American judges. But what are the consequences
if a limited en banc panel in the Ninth Circuit hands down a decision

13

W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 270 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.,

concurring).
1
See, e.g., Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 93, at 1038-39.
" Phil Zarone, Agenda Setting in the Courts of Appeals: The Effect of Ideology on En Banc
Rehearings, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 157, 164 (2000).
1
Moreover, Justice Frankfurter was construing the en banc statute of that era; he
wrote long before Congress enacted the legislation authorizing en banc hearings by less
than the full court. That legislation - which specifies no minimum number of judges for
the limited en banc court - necessarily rests on the premise that majority rule is not
required. See generally sources cited supra note 41.
1
See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (attributing
admonition to de Toqueville).
Daniel J. Meador, English Appellate Judgesfrom an American Perspective, 66 GEO. L.J.
1349 (1978).
Professor Meador updated this work in DANIEL J. MEADOR, MAURICE
ROSENBERG, & PAUL CARRINGTON, APPELLATE COURTS 757 (1994).

"4'See Meador, supranote 139, at 1366.

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 34:425

that would be rejected by the full court if it had the opportunity?
The answer depends, in the first instance, on the precedential
significance of the en banc decision. Some rulings will have little
importance for future litigation.
In that situation, it is hard to argue
that the frustration of majority rule will have anything other than
symbolic impact.
More commonly, however, an en banc decision can be expected to
establish a precedent that will be invoked by litigants in future cases.
Panels will be required to follow it even though a majority of the active
judges would disavow the decision if a vote were taken by the full
court.' 41 In this situation, the impact is certainly more than symbolic. Yet
even in this setting the consequences can easily be overstated.
First, an appellate decision is not an artifact, and the evolution of
circuit law does not come to an end with the en banc ruling. Rather,
under our system of precedent, the en banc decision will be tempered by
later decisions of panels, by subsequent en banc opinions, and by
decisions of the Supreme Court.
The more broadly applicable the en
banc opinion proves to be, the more opportunities judges will have to
qualify or limit the minority supported precedent. Moreover, as time
passes, the membership of the court will change, and the new judges will
put their own cast on the law of the circuit.
Second, if the court is so closely divided that the en banc outcome
depends on which eleven judges are selected from among twenty-eight
or fewer, that itself may suggest that the en banc ruling is a particularly
strong candidate for the process of evolution through "trial, and then
correction" that is the essence of the common law tradition.'" It borders
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One might think that a case would not be heard en banc unless it presents an issue

that does have future importance. That is not necessarily so. See, e.g., United States v.
Moore, 109 F.3d 1456, 1460 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (noting amendments to governing
statutes subsequent to events giving rise to case).
" Defenders of the Ninth Circuit's system often point out that, in fact, a mechanism is
available for correcting "erroneous" rulings by a limited en banc court. Under the court's
rules, any judge can call for rehearing by all active judges, and if a majority vote in the
affirmative, the case will be reheard. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
General Orders 5.8 (2000), available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov. On four occasions the
court has voted on a request for full-court rehearing; none of those requests has been
successful. I believe that resistance to full-court rehearing has become part of the court's
culture, and that the unsuccessful votes tell us little about the majority's view of particular
LEBC decisions.
1
See Arthur D. Hellman, Light on a DarklingPlain: IntercircuitConflicts in the Perspective
of Time and Experience, 1998 SuP. CT. REv. 249, 300-01 (1999).
'"

See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADmoN: DECIDING APPEALs 397

(1960); see also Hellman, Breaking the Banc, supra note 13, at 916-17.
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on the naive to think that a single six-to-five decision - whether by a
limited en banc court in the Ninth Circuit or by all eleven active judges
of the Eighth Circuit - could settle matters for all time in a developing
area of the law. 1'
Third, the occasional frustration of majority rule is not unique to the
Ninth Circuit. None of the federal courts of appeals take more than a
handful of cases en banc. In each of the other circuits, there are panel
decisions that a majority of the active judges might disagree with, but
that for one reason or another do not receive en banc rehearing.146 As in
the Ninth Circuit, aberrant rulings are cabined over time as precedents
are subjected47 to "redirection" or to the "checking, or reversal, of
movement.'1
Finally, even if one agrees with the White Commission that the limited
en banc is a highly flawed mechanism for correcting panel errors, there is
a certain irony in the Commission's proposed solution. Each of the
regional divisions would include "some judges not residing within the
division, assigned randomly or by lot for specified terms of at least three
years." 14 How valuable is majority rule when "the court" would be
composed of a shifting, and to some degree arbitrary, group of judges?
Perhaps the Commission recognized that, in the end, the idea of
"majority rule" is of limited value as a formula for the effective design of

14

Judge Learned Hand held a similar view. In the 1950s, he "mocked those courts [of

appeals] that resorted to the practice [of en banc rehearing] with ever increasing
frequency." GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 515-16 (1994).
Writing to a judge of the Third Circuit - where en bancs were more widely used - Hand
commented sardonically that the device "so much increases the certainty of the result. For
example, here [in an opinion [Third Circuit] Judge Goodrich had sent to Hand] your vote is
four to three, when it might have been only two to one." Id. at 516 (footnote omitted;
internal bracketing added).
" Even those who believe strongly in majority rule do not argue "that the court should
rehear 'every' panel decision with which the majority disagrees." See Ginsburg & Falk,
supra note 93, at 1035 (acknowledging that this course "would require an unimaginable
disregard of both personal and institutional costs"). Other judges go further in accepting
panel decisions with which they disagree. For example, Judge Jon 0. Newman, describing
the approach on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, has said:
We express our judicial convictions strongly as members of a panel but do not
insist that individual views prevail throughout the court. Despite the occasions
when each of us has read a panel opinion with which we profoundly disagree,
we have been able, to a remarkable degree, to submerge our individual judicial
convictions in the interest of the proper functioning of our court.

Jon 0. Newman, En Banc Practicein the Second Circuit: The Virtues of Restraint,50 BROOK. L.
REV. 365,384 (1984).
147
1

LLEWELLYN, supra note 144, at 113.
Final Report, supra note 2, at 43.
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a multi-judge court. Indeed, one can go further. One can argue that in
the federal courts of appeals, it is actually desirable for "the minority" to
prevail every now and then. The reason is that in any given period "the
majority" is likely to correspond - not always, but often - to the

appointees of one of the two great parties that dominate American
politics. 149 By allowing "the minority" an occasional victory, the Ninth
Circuit reduces the extent of the "sharp and unsettling shifts in the law"
that would otherwise result from the "periodic shifts in the ideological
roots of the majority." s°
I do not want to overstate the point. Majority rule resonates deeply for
Americans, even in the context of appellate adjudication. If limited en
banc courts were routinely handing down decisions that flouted the will
of a majority of the active judges, this would impair the legitimacy of the
procedure whatever the merits of the theoretical arguments that might
be advanced in support of the practice. But, on the available evidence,
that is not what has happened.
C. Conclusion
The use of a limited en banc court arouses unease because of the
unavoidable tension with intuitively appealing principles of majority
rule. And it is probably true that limited en banc courts sometimes fail
to correct panel decisions that the full court would view as erroneous.
But, like the high rate of reversal by the United States Supreme Court,
the occasional departures from majority rule do not provide sufficient
justification for restructuring the court of appeals as proposed by the
White Commission.

" For example, there is evidence that appointees of President Reagan were
substantially less "liberal" on a wide range of issues than appointees of President Carter.
Robert A. Carp et al.,The Voting Behavior of Judges Appointed by President Bush, 76
JUDICATURE 298, 300 (Table 3) (1993).
" See Browning Remarks, supra note 96, at 162. Judge Browning's phrase, "sharp and
unsettling shifts in the law," precisely describes what has happened at the National Labor
Relations Board as majority control has shifted from one President's appointees to those of
another. For example, the "Carter Board" issued a ruling that allowed nonunion
employees to bring a co-worker to disciplinary meetings with an employer. That decision
was reversed by the "Reagan Board" in 1985. In July 2000, a majority composed of Clinton
appointees overruled the Reagan Board precedent. See Carlos Tejada, Nonunion Employees
Win Right to Bring Co-Workers Along to DisciplineMeetings, WALL ST. J.,
July 13, 2000, at A2;
see also Michael D. Goldhaber, Is NLRB in a Pro-LaborMood?, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 9, 2000, at B1
(noting that Board, controlled by Democrats, issued twenty-two decisions overruling
precedent in two-year period).
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IV. THE FUTURE OF THE NINTH ClRcurr COURT OF APPEALS
The 106th Congress was a busy time for those who follow the
legislative fortunes of the Ninth Circuit. Soon after the new Congress
convened in January 1999, Senators Frank Murkowski of Alaska and
Slade Gorton of Washington introduced a bill that would have
implemented the recommendations of the White Commission, including
the restructuring of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals into semiautonomous adjudicative divisions. 51 A few months later, Senator
Dianne Feinstein countered with the "Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals En
Banc Procedures Act of 1999.,,112 As the title indicates, the legislation
would have mandated modifications of the en banc process in the Ninth
Circuit. The following year, a group of Senators - among them,
Judiciary Committee Chairman Orrin W. Hatch - introduced a bill that
would have divided the Ninth Circuit into two new circuits.ln
In the summer of 1999, hearings were held by the Judiciary
Committees in both the Senate and the House on the White
Commission's proposed restructuring of the Ninth Circuit.54 At those
hearings, witnesses who supported the Commission recommendation
argued that the time had come to bring the matter to closure. For
example, Ninth Circuit Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain of Oregon told the
Senate Judiciary Committee:
We've been engaged in guerilla warfare on this circuit split issue for
quite some time now. What we need to do is get back to judging.
You must force us to restructure now, one way or another, so that
we can concentrate on our sworn duties and end the distractions
caused by this long-running controversy.'
Judge Andrew J. Kleinfeld spoke in a similar vein, saying:
This issue of whether to split the Ninth Circuit has been the subject
of legislative attention since before I was born. Unless you split the
Ninth Circuit, I am sure that the debate will continue after I die.
The people suffer when their judges spend so much of their time as
S. 253, 106th Cong. (1999).
15

S. 1403, 106th Cong. (1999).
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 2000, S. 2184, 106th Cong.

(2000).
154 A
printed
version
of
the
Senate
hearing
is
available
at
http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary.
An electronic version of the House hearing is
available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary. I testified at the House hearing.
' 1999 Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 97 (prepared statement of Hon. Diarmuid F.
O'Scannlain, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit).
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this process takes on a matter other than adjudicating cases. We
have had numerous court meetings devoted to the issue of the split
since I was elevated to the Ninth Circuit eight years ago.... Several
of our judges, and all of our chief judges for many years, have spent
a great deal of time in going to Washington to address the issue.
And here we are again, today.
... All this judicial attention to the split issue takes a lot of time
away from deciding cases. And it will not stop until Congress splits
the Ninth Circuit
It is certainly true that the controversy over dividing the Ninth Circuit
has been going on for a long time, and that the judges of the circuit have
spent a great deal of time and effort dealing with the issue. But I believe
that the "closure" argument can more aptly be directed to the supporters
of restructuring than to those who oppose it. At least since 1973, serious
proposals for dividing the Ninth Circuit have been put forth by members
of Congress and by various study groups. In all that time, the
proponents have never succeeded in persuading a majority of the circuit
judges that restructuring is necessary or even desirable. Nor have the
proponents found a receptive ear among the court's constituents. On the
contrary, trial judges and representatives of the organized
bar have
15 7
repeatedly spoken out against circuit-splitting legislation.
I suggest that the time has come for advocates of restructuring to
acknowledge that the arguments for dividing the Ninth Circuit (or its
court of appeals) simply have not carried the day with the judges and
lawyers within the circuit. The reason that so much time and effort has
been diverted to "this circuit split issue" is that circuit division proposals
have been advanced again and again notwithstanding their rejection by a
majority of those who would be most directly affected. The "Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 2000," introduced on
May 7, 2000 by Senator Hatch and others, is almost identical to the
"Ninth Circuit Court of Apgeals Reorganization Act of 1989." That bill,
after extensive hearings,
died without being reported out of

" 1999 Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 83 (prepared statement of Hon. Andrew J.
Kleinfeld, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit).
" See Chief Judge Procter Hug, Jr., The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the
FederalCourt of Appeals' Final Report: An Analysis of the Commission's Recommendationsfor the
Ninth Circuit, 32 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 887, 897 (1999) (listing individuals and organizations
opposing division of circuit); Procter Hug, Jr., The Ninth Circuit Should Not Be Split, 57
MONT. L. REV. 291,305-06 (1996) (noting opposition by judges and organized bar).
" Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ReorganizationAct of 1989: Hearings on S. 948 Before the
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committee. The 1989 proposal, in turn, bears a close resemblance to the
measure introduced by Senator Gorton in 1983.' 6 That legislation too
had the161benefit of hearings, after which the Judiciary Committee took no
action.

Advocates of circuit division have, of course, every right to put forth
their ideas, whether in the form of legislation or otherwise. But their
efforts exact a cost - the "distractions" and "guerrilla warfare" that Judge
O'Scannlain referred to. Perhaps at some time in the future the judges
and lawyers of the Ninth Circuit will agree that the court of appeals is
simply too large to operate effectively. They will then do what the
judges and lawyers of the Fifth Circuit did two decades ago: they will
abandon their opposition to division and ask Congress to act.' 62 Until
that time, those who care about the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals can
serve it best by freeing the judges from the "distractions" generated by
legislative battles. This will allow the judges to "get back to judging" and also to continue their impressive record of experimentation and
innovation in the mechanisms and structures of appellate justice.

Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong.
(1990).
" See Conrad Burns, Dividing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: A Proposition Long
Overdue, 57 MoNT. L. REV. 245, 247 (1996).
S. 1156, 98thCong. (1983).
161 See Burns, supra note 159, at 247.
See Hellman, Dividing the Ninth Circuit, supra note 14, at 269; Hellman, Judicial
Reform, supra note 41, at 347.

